Abstract. Android embodies security mechanisms at both OS and application level. In this platform application security is built primarily upon a system of permissions which specify restrictions on the operations a particular process can perform. The critical role of these security mechanisms makes them a prime target for (formal) verification. We present an idealized model of a reference monitor of the novel mechanisms of Android 6 (and further), where it is possible to grant permissions at run time. Using the programming language of the proof-assistant Coq we have developed a functional implementation of the reference validation mechanism and certified its correctness with respect to the specified reference monitor. Several properties concerning the permission model of Android 6 and its security mechanisms have been formally formulated and proved. Applying the program extraction mechanism provided by Coq we have also derived a certified Haskell prototype of the reference validation mechanism.
Introduction
The Android [19] platform for mobile devices captures more than 85% of the total market-share [14] . Mobile devices allow people to develop multiple tasks in different areas, regrettably, the benefits of using them are counteracted by increasing security risks.
Android embodies security mechanisms at both OS and application level. Application security is built primarily upon a system of permissions, which specify restrictions on the operations a particular process can perform. Permissions in Android are basically tags that developers declare in their applications, more precisely in the so-called application manifest, to gain access to sensitive resources. On all versions of Android an application must declare both the normal and the dangerous permissions it needs in its application manifest. However, the effect of that declaration is different depending on the system version and the application's target SDK level [3] . In particular, if a device is running Android 6 (Marshmallow) and the application's target SDK is 23 or higher the application has to list the permissions in the manifest, and it must request each dangerous permission it needs while the application is running. The user can grant or deny each permission, and the application can continue to run with limited capabilities even if the user denies a permission request. This modification of the access control and decision process, on the one side, streamlines the application install process, since the user does not need to grant permissions when he/she installs or updates an application. On the other hand, as users can revoke the (previously granted) permissions at any time, the application needs to check whether it has the corresponding privileges every time it attempts to access a resource on the device [3] . The important and critical role of these security mechanisms makes them a prime target for (formal) verification.
Security models play an important role in the design and evaluation of security mechanisms of systems. Their importance was already pointed out in 1972 in the Anderson report [1] , where the concept of reference monitor was first introduced. This concept defines the design requirements for implementing what is called a reference validation mechanism, which shall be responsible for enforcing the access control policy of a system. The work presented here is concerned with the formal analysis and verification of properties performed on an idealized model that abstracts away the specifics of any particular implementation, and yet provides a realistic setting in which to explore the issues that pertain to the realm of (critical) security mechanisms of Android.
Contributions In [8, 9] , we have presented a formal specification of an idealized formulation of the permission model of version 5 of Android. Here we present an enriched version of that model which can be used to perform a formal analysis of the novel mechanisms of Android 6, which make it possible to grant permissions at run time. Furthermore, using the programming language of Coq [22] we have developed an executable (functional) specification of the reference validation mechanism and it has been proved that those functions conform to the axiomatic specification as specified in the model. Additionally, and using the program extraction mechanism provided by Coq, we have derived a certified Haskell prototype of the reference validation mechanism. Several properties concerning the security model of Android 6 have been formally formulated and proved.
Organization of the paper Section 2 reviews the security mechanisms of Android. Section 3 describes the formal axiomatic specification of the Android security system and discusses some of the verified properties. Section 4 presents a functional (operational) semantics of the specified reference monitor and outlines its proof of correctness. This section also discusses security properties satisfied by the certified implementation of the security mechanisms. Section 5 considers related work and finally, Section 6 concludes with a summary of our contributions and directions for future work. The full formalization may be obtained from [15] and verified using the Coq proof assistant.
Android's security model
The architecture of Android takes the form of a software stack which comprises an OS, a run-time environment, middleware, services and libraries, and applications. An Android application is built up from components. A component is a basic unit that provides a particular functionality and that can be run by any other application with the right permissions. There exist four types of components [2] : i) activity, which is essentially a user interface of the application; ii) service, a component that executes in background without providing an interface to the user; iii) content provider, a component intended to share information among applications; and iv) broadcast receiver, a component whose objective is to receive messages, sent either by the system or an application, and trigger the corresponding actions. Activities, services and broadcast receivers are activated by a special kind of message called intent. An intent makes it possible for different components to interact at runtime. A intent filter specifies the types of intents that a component receiver can respond to [2] . Applications usually need to use system resources to execute properly. Since applications run inside sandboxes, this entails the existence of a decision procedure (a reference validation mechanism) that guarantees the authorized access to those resources. Decisions are made by following security policies using a simple notion of permission. Every permission is identified by a name/text, has a protection level and may belong to a permission group. There exist two principal classes of permissions: the ones defined by the application, for the sake of self-protection; and those predefined by Android, which are intended to protect access to resources and services of the system. An application declares -in a XML file called AndroidManifest-the set of permissions it needs to acquire further capacities than the default ones. When an action involving permissions is required, the system determines which permissions every application has and either allows or denies its execution.
Depending on the protection level of the permission, the system defines the corresponding decision procedure [4] . There are four classes of permission levels: i) Normal, assigned to low risk permissions that grant access to isolated characteristics; ii) Dangerous, permissions of this level are those that provide access to private data or control over the device. From version 6 of Android dangerous permissions are not granted at installation time; iii) Signature, a permission of this level is granted only if the application that requires it and the application that defined it are both signed with the same certificate; and iv) Signature/System, this level is assigned to permissions that regulate the access to critical system resources or services. Additionally, an application can also declare the permissions that are needed to access it. A running application may ask the user to grant it dangerous permission groups and ungrouped permissions, who in turn can accept or decline this request.
If the execution of an action requires for an application to have certain permission the system will first make sure that this holds by means of the following rules: i) the application must declare the permission as used in its manifest; ii) if the permission is of level Normal, then the application does have it; iii) if the permission is of level Dangerous and belongs to a permission group, such group must have been granted to the application; iv) if the permission is of level Dangerous but is ungrouped, then it must have been individually granted to the application; v) if the permission is of level Signature, then the both the involved application and the one that declares it must have been signed with the same certificate; vi) lastly, if the permission is of level Signature/System, then the involved application must have been signed with either the same certificate as the one who declares it or the certificate of the device manufacturer. Otherwise, an error is thrown and the action is not executed. Android provides two mechanisms by which an application can delegate its own permissions to another one. These mechanisms are called pending intents and URI permissions. An intent may be defined by a developer to perform a particular action. A PendingIntent is an object which is associated to the action, a reference that might be used by another application to execute that action. The URI permissions mechanism can be used by an application that has read/write access to a content provider to delegate those permissions to another application.
Formalization of the permission model
In this section we provide a short account of the axiomatic semantics of the Android security system and discuss some of the verified security properties.
Formal language used The Coq proof assistant provides a (dependently typed) functional programming language and a reasoning framework based on higher order logic to perform proofs of (complex) specifications and programs. Coq allows developing mathematical facts. This includes defining objects (sets, lists, streams, functions, programs); making statements (using basic predicates, logical connectives and quantifiers); and finally writing proofs. The type of propositions is called Prop. The Coq environment provides program extraction towards languages like Ocaml and Haskell for execution of (certified) algorithms [16, 17] .
In this work, enumerated types and sum types are defined using Haskell-like notation; for example, option T def = N one | Some (t : T ). Record types are of the form {l 1 : T 1 , . . . , l n : T n }, whereas their elements are of the form {t 1 , . . . , t n }. Field selection is written as r.l i . We also use {T } to denote the set of elements of type T . Finally, the symbol × defines tuples, and nat is the datatype of natural numbers. We omit Coq code for reasons of clarity; this code is avalilable in [15] .
Model states
The Android security model we have developed has been formalized as an abstract state machine. In this model, states (AndroidST) are modelled as 12-tuples that respectively store data about the applications installed, their permissions and the running instances of components; the formal definition appears in Figure 1 .
The type PermId represents the set of permissions identifiers; PermGroup, the set of permission groups identifiers; Comp, the application components whose code will run on the system; AppId represents the set of application identifiers; iComp is the set of identifiers of running instances of application components; ContProv is a subset of Comp, a special type of component that allows sharing resources among different applications; a member of the type Uri is a particular uri (uniform resources identifier); the type Res represents the set of resources an application can have (through its content providers, members of ContProv); the type Val is the set of possible values that can be written on resources; an intent -i.e. a member of type Intent-represents the intention of a running component instance to start or communicate with other applications; a member of SysImgApp is a special kind of applications which are deployed along with the OS itself and has certain privileges, like being impossible to uninstall. The first component of a state records the identifiers (AppId) of the applications installed by the user. The second and third components of the state keep track, respectively, of the permission groups (PermGroup) and ungrouped permissions granted to each application present in the system, both the ones installed by the user and the system applications. The fourth component of the state stores the set of running component instances (CompInstance), while the components DelPPerms and DelTPerms store the information concerning permanent and temporary permissions delegations, respectively 3 . The seventh and eight components of the state store respectively the values (Val) of resources (Res) of applications and the set of intents (Intent) sent by running instances of components (iComp) not yet processed. The four last components of the state record information that represents the manifests of the applications installed by the user, the certificates (Cert) with which they were signed and the set of per-missions they define. The last component of the state stores the set of (native) applications installed in the Android system image, information that is relevant when granting permissions of level Signature/System. A manifest (Manifest) is modelled as a 6-tuple that respectively declare application components (set of components, of type Comp, included in the application); optionally, the minimum version of the Android SDK required to run the application; optionally, the version of the Android SDK targeted on development; the set of permissions it may need to run at its maximum capability; the set of permissions it declares; and the permission required to interact with its components, if any. Application components are all denoted by a component identifier. A content provider (ContProv), in addition, encompasses a mapping to the managed resources from the URIs assigned to them for external access. While the components constitute the static building blocks of an application, all runtime operations are initiated by component instances, which are represented in our model as members of an abstract type.
We define a notion of valid state, through the predicate valid_state on the elements of type AndroidST, that captures several well-formedness conditions. The definition is provided in Appendix A.
Action semantics
The axiomatic semantics of the Android security system is modeled by defining a set of actions, and providing their semantics as state transformers. Table 1 summarises a subset of the actions specified in our model, which provide coverage to the different functionalities of the Android security model.
The behaviour of actions (of type Action) is specified by a precondition P re and by a postcondition P ost of respective types: P re : AndroidST → Action → P rop, and P ost : AndroidST → Action → AndroidST → P rop. For instance, the axiomatic semantics of the install action is given by:
The precondition of action install app m c lRes in a state s requires that the application is not already installed, and that no system application has its same identifier (¬isAppInstalled(app, s)). m, s) ). Finally, the intent filters of its components (c ∈ cmp(m)) must be well defined; the specified types of intents must match (cmpDeclareIntentF ilterCorrectly(c)). The postcondition of action install app m c lRes, with initial state s and final state s ′ , specifies that its manifest (m), the certificate with which it was signed (c) and the permissions it defines that are not system permissions must be added to the state bound to the application identifier (predicates addM anif est, addCert, and addDef P erms); which in turn must be included in the list of installed applications (addApp(app, s, s ′ )). The application resources are initialized with the initial value initV al (addRes(app, lRes, s, s ′ )), while the lists of permission and permission groups granted to the application are initialized as empty (initializeP ermLists(app, s, s ′ )). The rest of the system components remain unchanged (sameOtherF ields_install(s, s ′ )).
Executions
There can be attempts to execute an action on a state that does not verify the precondition of that action. In the presence of one such situation the system answers with a corresponding error code (of type ErrorCode). 
Lemma 1 (Validity is invariant).
The results presented in this work are obtained from valid states of the system.
Reasoning over the specified reference monitor
In this section we present and discuss some relevant properties that can be established concerning the Android Marshmallow security framework. In particular we shall focus on vulnerabilities that if exploited would allow violations to the intended security policy. The helper functions and predicates used to define the properties and lemmas discussed in this paper are presented and described in Table 2 . The full formal definition of the lemmas as well as those of other security properties that were formally analyzed can be found in [15] , along with their corresponding proofs. We also include an informal description of each property, in italics. The first property presents a controversial characteristic of Android's new permission system. For example, as the dangerous permissions READ_CONTACTS (required for reading the contact list) and WRITE_CONTACTS (required for writing the contact list) both belong to the permission group CONTACTS, none of them can be individually granted. Instead, the application must be granted the permission group CONTACTS, giving it the right to both reading and writing the user's contact list. This violates the intended least privilege security policy claimed by the designers of the platform. 
Property 1 (No fine control over grouped permissions)

Table 2. Helper functions and predicates
Android's permission system is not granular enough for granting a proper subset of the set of permissions that belong to a group.
The next property formalizes another weak point in the specification of Android's new permission system: in a valid state an application may have the right of writing the contact list (WRITE_CONTACTS) even if this permission was never individually granted.
Property 2 (Implicit individual permission granting)
∃(s : AndroidST)(p : Perm)(app : AppId), valid_state(s) ∧ getP ermissionLevel(p) = dangerous ∧ p / ∈ getGrantedP ermsF orApp(app, s) ∧ p / ∈ getDef P
ermsF orApp(app, s) ∧ appHasP ermission(app, p, s)
Applications may obtain privileges that were never granted to it.
In Android 6 an application that wishes to send information through the network must have the permission INTERNET but, since this permission is of level normal, any application that lists it as used in its manifest file has the right to access the network in an implicit and irrevocable way. Once again, this has been criticized due to the potential information leakage it allows. The following property formally generalizes this situation and embodies a reasonable argument to roll back this security issue introduced in Android Marshmallow.
Property 3 (Internet access implicitly and irrevocably allowed)
∀(s : AndroidST)(sac : SACall)(c : Comp)(ic : iComp)(p : Perm), anif estF orApp(getAppF romCmp(c, s), s) 
A certified reference validation mechanism
The implementation of the Android security system that we have developed consists of a set of Coq functions such that for every predicate involved in the axiomatic specification of action execution there exists a function which stands for the functional counterpart of that predicate. In this section we show how the correctness of the implementation is certified by a formal proof that establishes its soundness with respect to the inductive (axiomatic) semantics of the Android security mechanisms. The execution of an action has been implemented as a step function that given a system state s and an action a invokes the function that implements the execution of a in s and returns an object res of type Result def = {resp : Response, st : AndroidST}, where res.resp is either an error code ec, if the precondition of the actions does not hold in state s, or otherwise the value ok, and the state res.st represents the execution effect. The step function acts basically as an action dispatcher. Figure 2 , which shows the structure of the dispatcher, details the branch corresponding to the dispatching of action install, which is the action we shall use along this section to illustrate the working of the implementation. The functions invoked in the branches, like 
Fig. 2. The step function and execution of install action
install_saf e, are state transformers whose definition follows this pattern: first it is checked whether the precondition of the action is satisfied in state s, and then, if that is the case, the function that implements the execution of the action is invoked. Otherwise, the state s, unchanged, is returned along with an appropriate response specifying an error code which describes the failure. In this figure we also describe the function that implements the execution of the install action. The Coq code of this function, together with that of the remaining functions, can be found in [15] 5 . The function install_pre is defined as the nested validation of each of the properties of the precondition, specifying which error to throw when one of them doesn't hold. The function install_post implements the expected behavior of the install action: the identifier of the application is prepended to the list of installed applications, both the list of granted permission and the list of granted permission groups are initialized as empty for it, its resource list is added to the system, and its manifest, certificate and defined permissions are included in the system state 6 .
Soundness
We proceed now to outline the proof that the functional implementation of the security mechanisms of Android correctly implements the axiomatic model. This correctness property has been formally stated as a soundness theorem and verified using Coq [15] .
Theorem 1 (Soundness of Android security system implementation). ∀ (s : AndroidST) (a : Action), valid_state(s) → s ֒ a/step(s,a).resp
−−−−−−−−−−→ step(s, a).st
The proof of this theorem follows by, in the first place, performing a case analysis on P re(s, a) (this predicate is decidable) and then in the case that P re(s, a) applying Lemma 2; otherwise applying Lemma 4.
Lemma 2 (Soundness of valid execution).
The proof of Lemma 2 proceeds by applying functional induction on step(s, a) and then by providing the corresponding proof of soundness of the function that implements the execution of each action. Thus, in the case of the action install we have stated and proved Lemma 3. This lemma, in turn, follows by performing a case analysis on the result of applying the function install_pre on s and the action: if the result is an error code then the thesis follows by contradiction. Otherwise, it follows by the correctness of the function install_post.
Lemma 3 (Correctness of install execution).
∀ (s : AndroidST) (app : App) (m : Manifest) (c : Cert) (lRes : list Res),
valid_state(s) → P re(s, install app m c lRes) → P ost(s, install app m c lRes, install_post(app, m, c, lRes, s))
As to Lemma 4, the proof also proceeds by first applying functional induction on step(s, a). Then, for each action a, it is shown that if ¬P re(s, a) the execution of the function that implements that action yields the values returned by the branch corresponding to the case that the function that validates the precondition of the action a in state s fails, i.e., an error code ec and the (unchanged) state s. ErrorM sg(s, a, ec) 
Lemma 4 (Soundness of error execution).
∀ (s : AndroidST) (a : Action), valid_state(s) → ¬P re(s, a) → ∃ (ec : ErrorCode), step(s, a).st = s ∧ step(s, a).resp = error(ec) ∧
Reasoning over the certified reference validation mechanism
We have modeled the execution of the permission validation mechanism during a session of the system as a function that implements the execution of a list of actions starting in an (initial) system state. The output of the execution, a trace, is the corresponding sequence of states. We have stated and proved several security properties over the function trace. In what follows s, initstate, sndstate and laststate stand for variables of type AndroidST, p is a variable of type Perm, app and app ′ of type AppId and l of type list Action. We present first a property that formally states that in version 6 of the OS for an application to have a non-grouped dangerous permission it must be explicitly granted to it.
Property 4 (Dangerous permissions must be explicitly granted)
A non-grouped dangerous permission can only be explicitly granted to an application.
With the following property we formally state, and prove, that if an application used to have a permission that was later revoked, only re-granting it will allow the application to have it again.
Property 5 (Revoked permissions must be regranted)
If an application used to have a permission that was later revoked, only regranting it will allow the application to have it again.
Certain assertions on which a developer could rely in previous versions of Android OS do not hold in its latest version. The following property states that a running component may have the right of starting another one on a certain state, but may not be able to do so at a later time. When an application app is granted a permission p to access certain resource, it is also given the right to delegate this ability to another application, say app ′ , to access that same resource on its behalf. However, if p is revoked from the application app, the permission delegations is not invalidated and thus the application app ′ may still be able to access the resource. This property is a proof that the current specification allows a behavior which is arguably against the user's will.
Property 6 (The right to start an external component is revocable)
∀(c : Comp)(act : Activity) valid_state(initState) → getP ermissionLevel(p) = dangerous → permissionIsGrouped(p) = N one → app = app ′ → p / ∈ getDef P ermsF orApp(app, initState) → inApp(c, app, initState) → inApp(act, app ′ , initState) → cmpP rotectedByP erm(act) = Some p → canStart(c, act, initState) → ∃(l : list Action), uninstall app / ∈ l ∧ uninstall app ′ / ∈ l ∧ ¬canStart(c
Property 7 (Delegated permissions are not recursively revoked)
In Android 6 if a permission p is revoked for an application app not necessarily shall be revoked for the applications to which app delegated p.
Related work
Several analyses have been carried out concerning the security of the Android system [11, 18, 10, 12, 13] . Few works, however, pay attention to the formal aspects of the permission enforcing framework. In particular, Shin et al. [20, 21] build a formal framework that represents the Android permission system, which is developed in Coq, as we do. However, that work does not consider several aspects of the platform covered in our model, namely, the different types of components, the interaction between a running instance and the system, the R/W operation on a content provider, the semantics of the permission delegation mechanism and novel aspects of the security model, such as the management of runtime permissions.
Moving away from OS verification, many works have addressed the problem of relating inductively defined relations and executable functions, in particular in the context of programming language semantics. For instance, Tollitte et al [23] show how to extract a functional implementation from an inductive specification in the Coq proof assistant. Similar approaches exist for Isabelle, see e.g. [7] . Earlier, alternative approaches such as [5, 6] aim to provide reasoning principles for executable specifications.
Conclusion and future work
We have presented the development of an exhaustive formal specification of the Android security model that includes elements and properties that have been partially analyzed in previous work. We have enhanced the model considered in [8, 9] with an explicit treatment of errors and with the latest version of the security mechanisms of the platform, which make it possible to grant permissions at run time. We also present the formaization of security properties concerning the Android permission mechanisms that have not previously been formally verified and proved. Using the programming language of the proof-assistant Coq we have defined a functional implementation of the reference validation mechanism, certified its correctness with respect to the axiomatic specification of the reference monitor and derived a certified Haskell prototype (CertAndroidSec) applying the program extraction mechanism provided by the proof assistant. In Appendix B, we provide listings of part of the Haskell code that has been automatically generated using Coq. The full certified code is available in [15] . The formal development is about 21k LOC of Coq, including proofs, and constitutes a suitable basis for reasoning about Android's permission model and security mechanisms.
We plan to use the certified extracted algorithm as a testing oracle and also to conduct verification activities on actual implementations of the platform. In particular, we are investigating the use of that algorithm to compare the results of executing an action on a real Android platform and executing that same action on the correct program. This would allow us to monitor the actions performed in a real system and assessing whether the intended security policy is actually enforced by the particular implementation of the platform.
A Valid state
The model formalizes a notion of valid state that captures several well-formedness conditions. It is formally defined as a predicate valid_state on the elements of type AndroidST. This predicate holds on a state s if the following conditions are met:
-all the components both in installed applications and in system applications have different identifiers; -no component belongs to two different applications present in the device; -no running component is an instance of a content provider; -every temporally delegated permission has been granted to a currently running component and over a content provider present in the system; -every running component belongs to an application present in the system; -every application that sets a value for a resource is present in the system; -the domains of the partial functions Manifests, Certs and AppDefPS are exactly the identifiers of the user installed applications; -the domains of the partial functions AppPS and PermsGr are exatcly the identifiers of the applications in the system, both those installed by the users and the system applications; -every installed application has an identifier different to those of the system applications, whose identifiers differ as well; -all the permissions defined by applications have different identifiers; -every partial function is indeed a function, that is, their domains don't have repeated elements; -every individually granted permission is present in the system; and -all the sent intents have different identifiers.
All these safety properties have a straightforward interpretation in our model. We omit here the formal definition of valid_state due to space constraints. The full formal definition of the predicate is available in [15] .
B Generated code
Just for the sake of illustration, in what follows we provide listings of part of the Haskell code that has been automatically generated using the Coq extraction mechanism. The code is annotated with inline comments and manually indented to fit on the page width.
We have included the definition of the System, as a datatype and the complete definition of the action install and the code of the dispatcher, which implements the execution of an action in a given state.
Listing 1.1. The System
{− T h e S y s t e m i s r e p r e s e n t e d a s a d a t a t y p e
− c o m p r i s i n g a S t a t e a n d a n E n v i r o n m e n t −} data System = S y s S t a t e Env i ronm ent
−− T h e E n v i r o n m e n t d a t a t y p e data Env i ronm ent = Env −− T h e m a n i f e s t a n d c e r t i f i c a t e o f i n s t a l l e d u s e r a p p l i c a t i o n s ( Mapping IdApp M a n i f e s t ) ( Mapping IdApp C e r t ) −− T h e p e r m i s s i o n s d e f i n e d b y t h e a p p l i c a t i o n s ( Mapping IdApp ( ( [ ] ) Perm0 ) ) −− S y s t e m a p p l i c a t i o n s ( ( [ ] ) SysImgApp ) −− T h e d a t a t y p e S t a t e data S t a t e = S t −− T h e i n s t a l l e d u s e r a p p l i c a t i o n s ( ( [ ] ) IdApp ) −− G r a n t e d g r o u p a n d i n d i v i d u a l p e r m i s s i o n s f o r e a c h a p p l i c a t i o n ( Mapping IdApp ( ( [ ] ) I dGrp ) ) ( Mapping IdApp ( ( [ ] ) Perm0 ) ) −− R u n n i n g c o m p o n e n t s a n d t h e i r i n s t a n c e s
( Mapping ICmp Cmp) −− P e r m a n e n t a 
n d t e m p o r a r y p e r m i s s i o n d e l e g a t i o n s
Listing 1.2. Install checks {− I n s t a l l s e m a n t i c s : − i n s t a l l _ p r e c h e c k s w h e t h e r a n i n s t a l l a t i o n c a n t a k e p l a c e i n a s t a t e . − I t r e t u r n s t h e c o r r e s p o n d i n g E r r o r C o d e i f t h e i n s t a l l a t i o n i s n o t a l l o w e d −}
i n s t a l l _ p r e : : IdApp −> M a n i f e s t 
n t s i n t h e a p p l i c a t i o n m u s t h a v e d i f f e r e n t i d e n t i f i e r s
> −− T h e d e f i n e d p e r m i s s i o n s m u s t h a v e d i f f e r e n t i d e n t i f i e r s .
> −− T h e n e w c o m p o n e n t s ' i d s m u s t d i f f e r f r o m t h o s e a l r e a d y p r e s e n t i n t h e s y s t e m .
l l t h e i n t e n t f i l t e r s m u s t b e w e l l d e f i n e d .
c a s e a n y D e f i n e s I n t e n t F i l t e r I n c o r r e c t l y ( cmp m) o f { Prelude . True −> Prelude . Ju st F a u l t y _ i n t e n t _ f i l t e r ;
−− I f e v e r y t h i n g i s o k , t h e n n o e r r o r i s r e t u r n e d .
Prelude . F a l s e −> Prelude . Nothing}}}}}}
